Do Liverpool really have an issue with rest defense?
As Arne Slot is known for developing a dynamic, offensive, and vertical variation of the so-called positional play, the question of defensive transition structure is on the table after Liverpool conceded 4 times in two games. While Arsenal is waiting in the corner, let’s dive into the topic, not forgetting an important factor: the players, as they act and decide what to do with the ball.
SlotBall – roles
In recent years, football has evolved, to say the least. Both in the way it’s played, and in the way it’s shown and discussed. Schemes and systems are now mentioned constantly, and at times they almost seem to be the only lens through which the game is read. Through this prism, Arne Slot’s positional formula is a more dynamic version of the “traditional” 3-2-5 or 2-3-5, embodied by so many teams since the 2010s.
As we could see with Man City’s perfectly balanced unit while attacking during their 2023 triumph, the players involved in building from the back are equally – if not more! – assigned to offering balance to their team when they lose the ball. In this regard, the double pivot Stones – Rodri (playing just in front of the “back 3”) was very limited in terms of offensive freedom. They were clearly part of a “defensive 5,” protecting the “offensive 5.”
City, somehow, were super predictable with the ball. And, for a lot of people, far from entertaining. They couldn’t care less. Balance in the defensive transition (and in the pure defensive phase) was their obsession, lining up 4 center-backs (plus Rodri) most of the time.
This is one of Slot’s defining traits since his Feyenoord days: he is not as rigid and strict as Guardiola was, and allows his double pivot to run vertically way more than City or any other “positional” team did.
It’s a general movement we can observe in the game nowadays: Vitinha and João Neves, for example, are clearly not the “quasi-CBs” Rodri and Stones were. Bayern, for example, are also offering more and more freedom to their 6s, as structure leads to predictability. In the Prem, Newcastle switched their established “pivot” Bruno Guimarães with the natural flying number 8 Tonali. Of course, looking for more dynamism when using the ball.
It’s in that framework that Mac Allister and Gravenberch are shining, in the (so-called!) double pivot. Two aspects were already clearly noticeable in Slot’s first big scalp in the League, thrashing United 3-0 at Old Trafford last year: first, most of the balls received by Mac Allister or his Dutch mate were given in space, not to feet.
Secondly, on that day (and in any game with their Dutch manager) Liverpool were absolutely not looking for any kind of symmetrical positioning of both of their 6s. Rather, the duo would regroup, confusing the opposition and forcing them into having only one man in the zone where they would stand with two. Of course, this way of attacking is designed for attack. Defensive transition is not the priority, unlike for the cold and pragmatic Citizens in 2023.
Beyond that, if Liverpool play “3-2-5,” then who is where? Robertson (in theory a member of the “back 3” as we see above) was certainly allowed to push high. As super-offensive fullbacks Kerkez and Frimpong joined this summer (and as Gvardiol and Walker did not!), Slot will certainly not (or even less than he ever did) look for a set and established group of 5 players at the bottom of his structure.
As Liverpool conceded two counter-attacks in decisive moments versus Bournemouth, and were seriously shaken by NUFC’s press in the boiling pot of St James’ Park, the question of the defensive transition is clearly on the agenda.
So much to unpack from this conversation. https://t.co/X2a1B6m0Vy pic.twitter.com/6pV3jRRRXF
— Samuel (@samuelap1_) August 16, 2025
Defensive transition relies on the opposition’s defensive shape…
Iraola’s aggressive defensive intentions are well known and documented. As ever, the Basque coach lined up an almost total pressing shape at Anfield. Bournemouth’s 4-1-2-3 was mirrored against Liverpool’s 4-2-1-3, as the midfield trio [Adams (DM) – Tavernier (LCM) – Scott (RCM)] marked respectively [Wirtz (CAM) – Szoboszlai (RCM) – Mac Allister (LCM)].
As seen above, at the time of triggering total press, Scott would jump from right CM to center forward, Adams would mark Szobo, and Diakhité (right CB) or his partner would have to step up on a CM, creating ten one-vs-one duels all over the pitch, in the purest Iraola “barbaric” style.
As Liverpool could not properly set up against a low, or mid-low block (which Bournemouth was not), they started with almost a back 4, in some sort of 4-2-4. This led to a pretty stable defensive transition from Liverpool, as 3-2-5/2-3-5 is only deployed when facing a low (or forced low) block.
Considering Bournemouth’s tendency to operate man-marking, Szoboszlai sometimes dropped on the left, rather than his usual right, and occupied the back 3 alongside Konaté and VVD, a position where Bournemouth would certainly have expected Kerkez.
This led to the first beating of the high press, with a diagonal pass from the Hungarian to Salah. Of course, Frimpong immediately ran through and “underlapped” in the right half-space. As we can see below, the transition was alright, as Konaté and Van Dijk were able to control preventively.
… Is part of a global power struggle between attack and defense
This is an obvious and logical fact: transition structure relies on the opposition’s defensive structure. As Liverpool force the opposition into a low block, in some sort of 5-4-1, having 5 players in a protective platform is less necessary. The freedom Slot gives to his players relies on the opponent’s structure.
This point was briefly mentioned by Arne Slot in his post-match interview, emphasizing the “if” before getting to the personnel required for rest defense.
Looking at the evolution of Liverpool’s shape before the first goal (against a rather high/mid-high block), it’s clearly not possible to identify 5 players staying at the base of any offensive (and “defensively transitional”) structure.
Following the same logic (even more so against man-marking), projecting into some sort of chaos and disorder forces the opposition to withdraw. An offensive player operating against Liverpool cannot just “pass the marking” waiting for the ball to come back and counter. His team would be at immense risk of conceding.
The second goal, at the 48th minute (that could have easily been the third or the fourth, as we have just seen), is also the product of such reckless behavior from Liverpool.
... and on players’ decisions!
Of course, as has been said, a question emerges: how could they be in a position to draw, 15 minutes from the end, after such dominance? It has to be said that changes were made, and that Semenyo’s shot (2-1) coming in the 66th minute was the first shot of the second half for the visitors.
2023 Man City could not be called anything other than a defensive team. The defensive transition was the priority, and the offensive phase was designed to make it perfect. As players are not machines, and this Liverpool side is certainly not such a cold and pragmatic unit, variations entail disorder.
At this moment, what matters (way more than the “system” or the “set-up”) is something we tend to forget: the players’ decisions. And their technical execution.
Also, it needs to be said that Bournemouth’s first goal is a “double transition.” Liverpool are defending, then moving into offensive transition, then losing the ball. The transition of the transition, in other words.
As mentioned by Jamie Carragher on MNF, Van Dijk communicates with Szobo, ordering him to offer balance as Liverpool are counter-attacking after pressing. VVD gets acknowledgement. But Szobo (who played as a No.10 all of last season) will never be a 6.
Put more simply than Arne Slot could (for obvious reasons) in front of a camera: what’s the pivotal point here? Salah’s decision.
Silly as it may sound, if the Egyptian had “frozen the ball” and held it up, no counter would have appeared.
As any proper Premier League unit would do everything to force a mistake from the ball holder, closing all of his solutions, short and long (for example playing a perfect offside trap), creative players inevitably end up in some sort of “make or break” pivotal decisions. Exactly the same as Gakpo was at the time of delivering the cross to Ekitike above.
Double transitions vs Newcastle’s hardcore verticality
And this is where Liverpool got it all right against the Magpies: whether it was while attacking, or counter-attacking (the offensive transition), they never gave away any dangerous ball played to feet in central midfield with poor timing.
https://t.co/O7I2aNP2TI https://t.co/R9XNMkRrib pic.twitter.com/krVmFx6YRl
— Victor Lefaucheux (@Premieretouche) August 25, 2025
Without the ball, Newcastle had the same kind of hostile project, pressing man-to-man, with Livramento jumping off right back onto Szoboszlai to create some sort of 3-1-2-4, matching the 4-2-1-3.
And this is where Liverpool got it all right against the Magpies: whether it was while attacking, or counter-attacking (the offensive transition), they never gave away any dangerous ball played to feet in central midfield with poor timing.
Although the live impression could be that they were hoofing the ball under NUFC’s pressure, it’s undeniable that most of the 3rd, 4th or 5th balls after those ping-pong exchanges were most often claimed by the Reds.
Wirtz’s first chance (12’) is the product of such smart use of long balls:
- Alisson plays long to non-offside Gakpo. The second ball is touched by Ekitike, then cleared by Schär: Liverpool earn a throw-in very high up the pitch.
- As Van Dijk and Konaté both move into the opposition’s box for the long throw, Kerkez knows he has no right to lose this ball after the initial clearance. After his cross, Liverpool’s counter-pressing is impeccable. And the foul on Gordon is very timely.
- In their typical and unique vertical style, NUFC immediately play into depth via Guimarães. Alisson reads it, clears, and once again, Eddie Howe’s team just don’t give you time to set up an offside trap or anything like that.
- On the opposition’s throw-in, Liverpool reiterate their 4-2-4 press. Most importantly, and contrary to the Bournemouth game, they make great use of the offensive transition balls they recover.
After Tonali’s loss, the Reds focus on the ball side, never giving Newcastle the lateral pass they expect.
Once again, the handling of the double transition makes the difference.
This excellent management of territorial play is emphasized by Gravenberch’s opener. This goal comes at the height of Newcastle’s momentum—or supposed momentum.
After two very ugly positional moments against NUFC’s “barricade” flat 4-5-1, Gravenberch steals the ball from Joelinton’s feet.
At this moment, this is the typical “make or break” situation: deprived of solutions, with Newcastle’s 3 forwards ready to break in behind him, the Dutchman knows that he is the (nonexistent!) Busquets (or Rodri…) of Liverpool.
Rather than losing the ball, he comes up with a great – instinctive! – idea: shooting.
Whether it’s Gravenberch or Wirtz, we can see a common blueprint: very few touches/steps before finalizing the play.
On that matter, it’s important to remind that Liverpool conceded zero goals and faced no real threat after losing the ball.
A global game – a dominant team
As the “build-up” is only a third of the attack, which is a quarter of all phases, “rest defense,” being part of this area, is only a twelfth of the actual game. Not including the pivotal throw-ins (a goal for Newcastle) and set-pieces (another one). Which would bring us, ironically, to around an eighteenth of the total game. 5.56%.
Without going too far in the sarcasm, the actual set-up, considering the importance of the players’ decisions… and actions! might be more negligible than it appears. Shouldn’t the real question be: “does it affect their actual competitiveness?”
Slot is not any boiling blood manager from the mediterranean sea. He would certainly not share in detail the way he prioritizes things and start a debate, while everything can be settled behind close doors.
As Liverpool were eliminated on penalties by the late winner of the UCL, and winning the best league in the world by a mile, their track records remains impressive.
Would those characteristics offer us a super ugly game vs Arsenal? Definitely conceivable. One thing is for sure: If Liverpool do not set up in a perfectly planned 3-2-5 with 5 holding defensive players… scoring on a counter will not be that simple. And most importantly, neither will not conceding.
